

Anna-Sara Malmgren
CURRICULUM VITAE
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Department of Philosophy
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Academic Employment

- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2011–present.
- Professor II at CSMN, University of Oslo, 2013–2015. (15% research appointment.)
- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2008–2011.

Education

- PhD in Philosophy, New York University, 2009.
Committee: Paul Boghossian (supervisor), Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright.
Dissertation Title: *Essays in the Theory of Justification*.
- BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 2001. (1st with Distinction.)
- BA in Philosophy, King's College, University of London, 1999. (1st with Distinction.)

Research Areas

- Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (AOS).
- Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics (AOC).

Academic Publications

(Articles)

- 'Varieties of Inference?', *Philosophical Issues: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning*, edited by C. Juhl and J. Schechter, 2018 (forthcoming).
- 'A Priori Testimony Revisited', *The A Priori In Philosophy*, edited by A. Casullo and J. Thurow, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 'Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements', *Mind*, vol. 120: 478, 263–327, 2011.
- 'Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?', *Philosophical Review*, vol. 115:2, 199–241, 2006.

(Reviews)

- Review of *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by H. Cappellen, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2013. (<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39362/>)
- Review of *Relying on Others* by S. Goldberg, *Mind*, vol. 120: 480, 1251–1258, 2011.

Work in Progress

(Books)

- *Understanding Inference* (working title), under contract with Oxford University Press.

(Articles)

- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, under review.
- TBA, for *Philosophical Issues: Epistemology*, edited by L. Miracchi and E. Sosa (2019).

Awards and Fellowships

- William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University, 2014–2015.
- APA Article Prize (for ‘Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements’), 2012.
- Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews, 2010.
- Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin, 2008–2010.
- Dean’s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, 2008.
- Dean’s Dissertation Award, New York University, 2006–2007.
- Frankel Fellowship, New York University, 2005–2006.
- McCracken Fellowship, New York University, 2001–2006.
- Scatcherd Scholarship, University of Oxford, 1999–2001.
- Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King’s College London, 1998.
- Sambrooke Exhibition, King’s College London, 1997.

Invited Talks and Commentaries

- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, CPA Annual Congress, June 2018.
- Reply to ‘Rationality Requires Rationally Representing Representations as Rational’ by R. Neta, Conference on Inference and Reasoning, UNC, April 2018.
- ‘Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure’, University of Lund, June 2016.
- ‘Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure’, University of Miami, April 2016.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Arizona State University, April 2015.
- ‘The Normativity of the Sub-Personal’, Högre Seminariet, University of Göteborg, April 2015.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Oberlin College, March 2015.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, 48th Chapel Hill Colloquium, October 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Simon Fraser University, October 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Reasoning Conference, University of Konstanz, July 2014.

- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, CSMN, University of Oslo, June 2014. (Co-organized with Olav Gjelsvik)
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, UC Irvine, May 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, UCLA, May 2014.
- ‘Inference and the Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation’, University of Notre Dame, April 2014.
- ‘On Getting Started’, Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University, February 2014.
- ‘A Puzzle about Inference’, University of Copenhagen, June 2013.
- ‘A Puzzle about Inference’, 5th Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto, June 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, CSLI Workshop, Stanford University, June 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, University of Arkansas, April 2013.
- Reply to ‘Intuitive Knowledge and the Benacerraf Problem’ by J. Bengson, Pacific APA, March 2013.
- ‘Philosophy Without *What?*’, Symposium on *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by H. Cappellen, The Institute of Philosophy (University of London) and CSMN (Oslo University), February 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, LEMMing Graduate Conference (keynote), University of Cologne, November 2012.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, University of Victoria, November 2012.
- ‘Particularistically Unreasonable’, Workshop on Intentions, University of Leeds, June 2012.
- ‘A Priori Testimony Revisited’, Harvard University, November 2011.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (keynote), University of St Andrews, October 2011.
- ‘A Priori Testimony Revisited’, North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2011.
- Reply to ‘Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem’ by C. Montemayor, UT-UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness, University of Texas at Austin, October 2011.
- Reply to ‘Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification’ by R. Neta, Pacific APA, April 2011.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Workshop on the Philosophy of Richard Feldman, University of Texas at San Antonio, February 2011.
- ‘Quine’s Two Dogmas’, University of Oslo, December 2010.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2010.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, King's College London, July 2010.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Stanford University, January 2010.

- ‘Sub-Personal Reasons’, Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reason, University of Leeds, June 2010.
- ‘The Content Problem’ and ‘Varieties of Inference’, Arché Methodology Seminar, University of St Andrews, June 2010.
- Reply to ‘McKinsey One More Time’ by C. Wright, Conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, CSMN, University of Oslo, June 2010.
- ‘Warrant-Preservation and Testimony’, Forry and Micken Lecture Series on the Philosophy of Testimony, Amherst College, March 2010.
- ‘Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori’, Basic Knowledge Workshop VI, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, March 2010.
- Reply to ‘Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief’ by D. Murray, Central APA, February 2010.
- ‘The Justification of Intuitive Judgments’, Workshop on Thought Experiments and The A Priori, University of Fortaleza, August 2009.
- ‘Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance’, Filosofidagarna, Lund University, June 2009.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University College London, March 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, Cornell University, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Rochester, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Western Ontario, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of California Berkeley, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Pittsburgh, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Texas at Austin, January 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of California Davis, January 2008.
- Reply to ‘Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?’ and ‘We’re Right, They’re Wrong’ by P. van Inwagen, Workshop on Science and Religion, New York Institute of Philosophy, March 2007.
- ‘What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn’t Know—And *How* Do We Know It?’, University of Texas at Austin, December 2006.
- ‘Intuitions and The A Priori’, Arché Epistemology Seminar, University of St Andrews, July 2006.
- Reply to ‘Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals’ by T. Williamson, Anders Wedberg Lectures, Stockholm University, April 2006.
- ‘A Priori Knowledge by Testimony’, Logic and Language Seminar, Stockholm University, June 2003.
- ‘Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?’, Cumberland Lodge Weekend, University of London, October 1997.

Professional Service

(Departmental)

- Member, Stanford Philosophy Diversity Committee (2018–present).
- Member, Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee (2013, 2015, 2017, 2018).
- Member, Peter Hawke’s Dissertation Committee (2013–2017).
- Member, Samuel Asarnow’s Dissertation Committee (2013–2015).
- Member, Stanford Philosophy Search Committee (2013–2015).
- Chair, Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee (2011–2014).
- Member, UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee (2010–2011).
- Member, UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee (2010–2011).
- Member, Jenn Nielson’s Dissertation Committee (2010).

(Other)

- Reader for: *Analysis*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Bellingham Summer Conference, *Dialectica*, *Disputatio*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis*, *Inquiry*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Mind*, NWO (Dutch Research Council), *Noûs*, Oxford University Press, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Routledge, *Synthese*, *Thought*, *Teorema*.
- Invited Discussant/Commentator-at-Large at: Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference, University of Pennsylvania, November 2017, November 2016; Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia, July 2017; Workshop on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen, June 2017; Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of South Alabama, May 2016; Epistemology and Cognition, College of William and Mary, September 2016.
- International cooperation partner, ‘Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives (EXTRA)’, Emmy Noether, German Research Foundation (2018–2022).
- International network member, ‘Knowledge Beyond Natural Science’, John Templeton Foundation, University of Stirling, the *Thought* trust (2017–2019).
- Member, sakkyndig komité, IFIKK, University of Oslo (2015).
- Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language, *Thought* (2013).
- Member, American Philosophical Association (2008–present).
- Affiliate, Stanford University Symbolic Systems Program (2011–present).

Courses Taught

(Stanford University)

- Advanced Dissertation Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring 2013–14, 2014–15, 2017–18. (G)
- ‘Self Knowledge and Consciousness’, Spring 2018. (UG)

- ‘Philosophy of Mind’, Spring 2013, 2014, 2016, Winter 2015, 2017. (UG/G)
- ‘Metaphysics’, Spring 2012, Winter 2017. (UG/G)
- ‘Rule-Following’, Fall 2014. (G)
- ‘Explanation and Justification’, Winter 2013, 2014. (UG)
- ‘Bounded Rationality’, Fall 2013. (UG)
- Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring 2012–2013. (G.)
- ‘Theory of Knowledge’, Spring 2012. (G/UG)
- ‘What’s an Inference?’ Winter 2012, Fall 2012. (G)

(University of Texas at Austin)

- ‘Thought Experiments’, Spring 2010. (G)
- ‘Theory of Knowledge’, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010. (UG)
- ‘Knowledge and Reality’, Fall 2009, 2010. (UG)

(New York University)

- ‘Minds and Machines’, Spring 2008. (UG)
- ‘Belief, Truth and Knowledge’, Fall 2007, Summer 2005. (UG)