

Krista Lawlor  
Henry Waldgrave Stuart Memorial Professor of Philosophy

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Areas of Specialization: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Language

EDUCATION

University of Michigan	1991-1999	<i>Ph.D.</i> Philosophy
Tufts University	1989-1991	<i>M.A.</i> Philosophy
University of New Hampshire	1984-1987	<i>B.A.</i> Mathematics magna cum laude

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

Stanford University	2015-	<i>Professor</i>
Stanford University	2007-2015	<i>Associate Professor</i>
Stanford University	1999-2007	<i>Assistant Professor</i>
University of Michigan	Spring 1999	<i>Visiting Assistant Professor</i>

HONORS & FELLOWSHIPS

Donald Andrews Whittier Fellow	
Stanford Humanities Center	2017-2018
Nina C. Crocker Research Fellow	2007-2010
School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford	
American Council of Learned Societies—Ryskamp Fellow	2005-2006
Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching (Stanford)	2003
Pedagogy Award	1998-1999
Rackham Graduate School (University of Michigan)	
Rackham Pre-Doctoral Fellowship	1996-1997
Rackham Graduate School (University of Michigan)	
Phi Beta Kappa	

MONOGRAPHS

*Being Reasonable*

Harvard University Press (pub. March 17, 2026)

*Assurance: An Austinian Account of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims*

Oxford University Press, 2013

*New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts, Studies in Philosophy*, Robert Nozick, ed. Garland Publishing, Inc. New York, NY, 2001

PAPERS

- “Modest Foundations for Perceptual Knowledge”, *New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure*, Routledge Press, Duncan Pritchard and Matthew Jope (eds.) August 2024.
- “Common Sense and the Skeptic”, *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* Roeber, Steup, Turri and Sosa, eds. April 2024
- “A Genealogy of Reasonableness”, *Mind*, Aug 2, 2022 <https://doi-org.stanford.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/mind/fzac036>)
- “Impersonal Epistemic Standards” *Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered*, Routledge Press, Christos Kyriacou, Kevin Wallbridge eds, 2021.
- “Knowledge and Reasonableness”, *Synthese* special issue *The Epistemic Significance of Non-Epistemic Factors*, 2021
- “Common Sense Philosophy: Wittgenstein and Austin”, *Companion to Common Sense Philosophy* Rik Peels, ed. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- “Ordinary Language Philosophy needs Situation Semantics (Or, why Grice needs Austin)”, *Context, Truth, and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism*, Marchesan and Zaperro, eds., Routledge, 2018
- “Austin on Perception, Knowledge and Meaning” *Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays*, Savas Tsohatzidis, ed. Cambridge University Press (2017).
- “Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation” *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, Special Issue: The Nature of Belief, Susanna Siegel ed. v. 57, no.1, 2014
- “Precis of *Assurance: An Austinian Account of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims*” Symposium, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2014 (with replies to critics).
- “The Files, Indexicals and Descriptivism” *Disputatio* v.5 n.36 Invited symposium on Francois Recanati’s *Mental Files*, 2013.
- “Varieties of Coreference” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, v. 81, no.2 p.485-495 2010
- “Knowing What One Wants” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2009
- “Self-knowledge of Belief: Seeking Causes” *American Imago* Brakel, L. ed. v.65, 3, 2008.
- “Moore’s Paradox” (with John Perry) *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* v.86.2008
- “A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion” *Mind and Language*, vol.22 no.2 April 2007, pp. 150-172.
- “Enough is Enough: Pretense and Invariance in the Semantics of ‘knows that’” in *Epistemology*, ed. John Hawthorne, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 19:211-236, 2005.

- “Memory” in *The Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford University Press, 2006.
- “Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-knowledge”  
*Synthese* vol.145, no.3, 467-495, 2005.
- “Living without Closure”  
 in *Epistemological Contextualism*, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69:  
 93-117, 2005.
- “Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation”  
*The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 55, no.218, 21-37, 2005.
- “Deliberation and Agential Authority: a Rejoinder to Ferrero”  
*Philosophical Psychology*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2003.
- “Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First Person Authority”  
*Philosophical Psychology* vol. 16, no. 4, 2003.
- “Memory, Anaphora and Content Preservation”  
*Philosophical Studies* vol.109: 97-119, 2002.

#### WORKS IN PROGRESS

- “A Role for Reasonable Emotion in the Epistemology of Value”  
 “A Role for Reasonableness in Shared Inquiry”

#### ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES, REVIEWS

- “How to Really Take Skepticism Seriously” 2025, Analysis reviews,  
 10.1093/analys/anaf063. A review of Adam Leite’s *How to Take  
 Skepticism Seriously*.
- Review of What is the Point of Knowledge? by Michael Hannon  
*Analysis*, Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2021, Pages 107–114  
 (DOI: [10.1093/analys/anaa066](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa066))
- “Telling as Joint Action” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  
 symposium on Richard Moran’s *Exchange of Words* 2020
- Review of *Knowledge First?* by Aidan McGlynn  
*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2015
- Review of *New Essays on Singular Thought* by Robin Jeshion  
*Mind*, 2013 (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzt017)
- Review of *Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood* by Simon Evnine  
*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2009.02.22
- Review of *Self-Knowledge and Resentment* by Akeel Bilgrami  
*Mind* April 2008, 117(466): 469-472
- Review of *Philosophical Psychology: a Contemporary Introduction* by Jose  
 Luis Bermudez *Philosophical Books* vl.48 no.2 April 2007, pp.180-182.
- “Ruth Millikan”  
*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* MacMillan, 2005

## SELECTED TALKS

- “Reasonable self knowledge” Valencia Philosophy Lab June 2026
- “How to Really Take Skepticism Seriously” APA Author Meets Critics on Adam Leite’s How to Take Skepticism Seriously. April 2025.
- “A Role for Reasonable Emotion in the Epistemology of Value”, University of Minnesota April 2025.
- “The Reasonable Person Standard: Social not Metaphysical”  
April 2018 Rationality and Reasonableness Conference, Cologne
- “The Reasonable Person Standard: Social not Metaphysical”  
July 2018 The Epistemic Significance of Non-Epistemic Factors, Osnabruck
- “Assurance, Knowledge and Situation Semantics ”  
June 2016 LOGOS Colloquium, University of Barcelona
- APA Author Meets Critics on Assurance, San Francisco  
April 2016
- “Austin and the Skeptical Paradox”  
October 2015 Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium
- “What is Known and the Limits of Deductive Inference”  
June 2014 University of Oslo, Perspectives on Inference Workshop
- “Ordinary Language and Experimental Philosophy”  
May 2014 Tufts University
- “What We Know and What We Don’t Know”  
April 2014 University of California, San Diego
- “Austin and the Skeptical Paradox”  
April 2013 University of California, Los Angeles
- “Epistemic Paradox and Semantic Theory”  
February 2013 *Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology* invited symposium on Epistemic Paradoxes
- “Files and Coreference”  
Spring 2012 APA (Pacific Division)
- “Certainty, Knowledge and Other Forms of Assurance”  
Spring 2010 University of California, Santa Cruz
- “Too Much Reference: comments on Frost-Arnold”  
Winter 2005 APA (Eastern Division)
- “Privileged Access: comments on Cullison”  
Spring 2005 APA (Pacific Division)
- “A Pretense Semantics for Knowledge”  
November 2004 The Ohio State University
- “Enough is Enough: What the Contextualist Should Really Say to the Skeptic”  
Spring 2003 American Philosophical Association (Central Division)
- “The New Privileged Access Problem”  
October 2002 Northwest Philosophy Conference  
Spring 2003 American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division)  
May 2004 University of California, Los Angeles

“Knowledge of Coreference”

April 2002 Claremont McKenna College

“Some Clearly Confused Ideas: Ruth Millikan on Re-identification”

March 2002 Author Meets Critics Session APA (Pacific Division)

“Talking about Belief: Reply to Ostertag”

Spring 2000 American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division)

#### PROFESSIONAL & COMMUNITY SERVICE

Chair, Committee on Academic Opportunities and Placement, APA 2013 – 2015.

APA Board 2013-2015

Program Committee Pacific Division APA 2012 – 2014

Associate Editor, *Erkenntnis* 2007-2010

#### DEPARTMENT AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE

Chair, Philosophy Department (2015-16, 2018-2021)

Director of Graduate Studies, Philosophy Department (2013-15)

Appointments and Promotions, School Humanities and Sciences (2015-2021)

Curriculum Committee, School of Humanities and Sciences (2012-14)

Steering Committee, Symbolic Systems Program (2002–2005, 2008-2016)

SUES Subcommittee on Writing & Oral Communication, School of Humanities and Sciences (2010-11)

Placement co-director, Philosophy (2011-2013)

Strategic Planning Committee Chair (2007-8)

Review of Philosophy Department Graduate Program (2010-2012)

Admissions Committee (2000-2003, 2008-2015), Chair (2002, 2015);

Tanner Library Committee (1999-2001); Colloquium Committee Chair (1999-2001, 2007-8)