

Stanford

Andrzej Skrzypacz

Theodore J. Kreps Professor in the Graduate School of Business and Professor, by courtesy, of Economics

Bio

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

- Professor, Economics
- Professor (By courtesy), Economics

Teaching

COURSES

2021-22

- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing: MGTECON 602 (Spr)
- Managerial Economics - Accelerated: MGTECON 203 (Win)

2020-21

- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing: MGTECON 602 (Spr)
- Economics of Strategy and Organization: MGTECON 533 (Spr)
- Managerial Economics - Accelerated: MGTECON 203 (Win)

2019-20

- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing: MGTECON 602 (Spr)
- Economics of Strategy and Organization: MGTECON 533 (Spr)
- Microeconomic Analysis I: MGTECON 600 (Aut)

2018-19

- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing: MGTECON 602 (Spr)
- Economics of Strategy and Organization: MGTECON 533 (Spr)

STANFORD ADVISEES

Doctoral Dissertation Reader (AC)

Anirudha Balasubramanian, Giacomo Mantegazza

Orals Chair

Ellen Muir

Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)

Martino Banchio, Zi Yang Kang, Lina Lukyantseva, Negar Matorian pour

Doctoral Dissertation Co-Advisor (AC)

Daniel Chen

Publications

PUBLICATIONS

- **Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility** *Telecommunications Policy*
Rosston, G. L., Skrzypacz, A.
2021; 45 (7)
- **Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring** *REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES*
Varas, F., Marinovic, I., Skrzypacz, A.
2020; 87 (6): 2893–2937
- **Persuading the Principal to Wait** *JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY*
Orlov, D., Skrzypacz, A., Zryumov, P.
2020; 128 (7): 2542–78
- **Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market** *REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS*
Fuchs, W., Skrzypacz, A.
2019; 33: 105–27
- **Test Design and Minimum Standards** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
DeMarzo, P. M., Kremer, I., Skrzypacz, A.
2019; 109 (6): 2173–2207
- **Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS*
Marinovic, I., Skrzypacz, A., Varas, F.
2018; 10 (2): 58–82
- **Selling Information** *JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY*
Horner, J., Skrzypacz, A.
2016; 124 (6): 1515-1562
- **Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information** *THEORETICAL ECONOMICS*
Fuchs, W., Ory, A., Skrzypacz, A.
2016; 11 (3): 1103-1144
- **Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
Levin, J., Skrzypacz, A.
2016; 106 (9): 2528-2551
- **Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers** *JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY*
Board, S., Skrzypacz, A.
2016; 124 (4): 1046-1087
- **Mechanisms for Repeated Trade** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS*
Skrzypacz, A., Toikka, J.
2015; 7 (4): 252-293
- **A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution** *MANAGEMENT SCIENCE*
Mitchell, M., Skrzypacz, A.
2015; 61 (7): 1598-1614
- **Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection** *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY*
Fuchs, W., Skrzypacz, A.
2015; 158: 371-406
- **TIME HORIZON AND COOPERATION IN CONTINUOUS TIME** *ECONOMETRICA*
Bigoni, M., Casari, M., Skrzypacz, A., Spagnolo, G.

2015; 83 (2): 587-616

- **Recall and private monitoring** *GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR*
Phelan, C., Skrzypacz, A.
2015; 90: 162-170
- **Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
Guttman, I., Kremer, I., Skrzypacz, A.
2014; 104 (8): 2400-2420
- **Limited records and reputation bubbles** *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY*
Liu, Q., Skrzypacz, A.
2014; 151: 2-29
- **Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS*
Fuchs, W., Skrzypacz, A.
2013; 5 (4): 219-243
- **Auctions with contingent payments - An overview** *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION*
Skrzypacz, A.
2013; 31 (5): 666-675
- **Rules with Discretion and Local Information** *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS*
Bowen, T. R., Kreps, D. M., Skrzypacz, A.
2013; 128 (3): 1273-1320
- **Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values** *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY*
Fuchs, W., Skrzypacz, A.
2013; 148 (3): 1226-1236
- **Beliefs and Private Monitoring** *REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES*
Phelan, C., Skrzypacz, A.
2012; 79 (4): 1637-1660
- **Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
Harrington, J. E., Skrzypacz, A.
2011; 101 (6): 2425-2449
- **Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
Fuchs, W., Skrzypacz, A.
2010; 100 (3): 802-836
- **The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions** *ECONOMETRICA*
Sannikov, Y., Skrzypacz, A.
2010; 78 (3): 847-882
- **Impossibility of collusion under imperfect monitoring with flexible production** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
Sannikov, Y., Skrzypacz, A.
2007; 97 (5): 1794-1823
- **Collusion under monitoring of sales** *RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS*
Harrington, J. E., Skrzypacz, A.
2007; 38 (2): 314-331
- **Dynamic signaling and market breakdown** *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY*
Kremer, I., Skrzypacz, A.
2007; 133 (1): 58-82
- **Network externalities and long-run market shares** *ECONOMIC THEORY*
Mitchell, M. F., Skrzypacz, A.

2006; 29 (3): 621-648

- **Bidding with securities: Auctions and security design** *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
DeMarzo, P. M., Kremer, I., Skrzypacz, A.
2005; 95 (4): 936-959
- **Inflation and price setting in a natural experiment** *JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS*
Konieczny, J. D., Skrzypacz, A.
2005; 52 (3): 621-632
- **Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining** *ECONOMETRICA*
Feinberg, Y., Skrzypacz, A.
2005; 73 (1): 69-91
- **Tacit collusion in repeated auctions** *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY*
Skrzypacz, A., Hopenhayn, H.
2004; 114 (1): 153-169