Stanford



Ilya Segal

Roy and Betty Anderson Professor and Professor, by courtesy, in Economics at the Graduate School of Business

Bio

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

- Professor, Economics
- Professor (By courtesy), Economics

ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS

- Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, (2008-2008)
- Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, (2004- present)
- Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University, (2002- present)
- Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University, (1999-2002)
- John Stauffer National Fellow, Hoover Institution, (1998-1999)
- Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, (1995-1998)
- Visiting Assistant Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (1995-1995)
- Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, (1991-1992)

HONORS AND AWARDS

- Test of Time Award for "an influential paper ... published between ten and twenty-five years ago", Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (2019)
- Edelman Award for Achievement in Advanced Analytics, Operations Research, and Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (2018)
- Citation of Excellence for "the most highly cited and influential paper", Emerald Publishing (2017)
- Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2017)
- Compass Lexecon Prize, Compass Lexecon (2008)
- Fellowship, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation (2002-2003)
- Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1999-2001)
- Graduate Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1994-1995)

BOARDS, ADVISORY COMMITTEES, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Editor-in-Chief, ACM Transactions in Economics and Computation (2017 present)
- Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2017 present)
- Associate Editor, Econometrica (2015 present)
- Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2013 present)

- Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (2013 2015)
- Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies (2010 2016)
- Member, Economics Panel, National Science Foundation (2008 2010)
- Member, Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4 (2006 2009)
- Member, Toulouse Network on Information Technology (2005 present)
- Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department (2005 2011)
- Member, Committee on Libraries, Stanford University (2004 2007)
- Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University (2004 2005)
- Fellow, Econometric Society (2003 present)
- Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2003 2005)
- Member, Editorial Board, American Economic Review (2002 2005)
- Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (2002 2003)
- Editor, B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics (1999 2005)
- Associate Editor, RAND Journal of Economics (1998 2006)

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

- Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (1995)
- M.S., Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Applied Mathematics (1991)

LINKS

• Segal Website: http://web.stanford.edu/~isegal/

Teaching

COURSES

2023-24

- Contracts, Information, and Incentives: ECON 282 (Win)
- Microeconomic Theory Seminar: ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Microeconomics I: ECON 202 (Aut)
- Microeconomics III: ECON 204 (Spr)

2022-23

- Contracts, Information, and Incentives: ECON 282 (Win)
- Microeconomic Theory Seminar: ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Microeconomics I: ECON 202 (Aut)

2021-22

- Contracts, Information, and Incentives: ECON 282 (Win)
- Microeconomic Theory Seminar: ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Microeconomics I: ECON 202 (Aut)

2020-21

- Contracts, Information, and Incentives: ECON 282 (Win)
- Economic Analysis II: ECON 51 (Spr)

• Microeconomic Theory Seminar: ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr)

Publications

PUBLICATIONS

Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Milgrom, P., Segal, I.

2020; 128 (1): 1-31

• Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES

Carroll, G., Segal, I. 2019; 86 (4): 1527–55

• Operations Research Enables Auction to Repurpose Television Spectrum for Next-Generation Wireless Technologies INTERFACES

Kiddoo, J. L., Kwerel, E., Javid, S., Dunford, M., Epstein, G. M., Meisch, C. E., Hoffman, K. L., Smith, B. B., Coudert, A. B., Sultana, R. K., Costa, J. A., Charbonneau, S., Trick, et al

2019; 49 (1): 7-22

• Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Leyton-Brown, K., Milgrom, P., Segal, I.

2017; 114 (28): 7202-7209

• PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFICIENCY OF BARGAINING JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2016; 14 (6): 1287-1328

• What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS

Jeziorski, P., Segal, I.

2015; 7 (3): 24-53

• DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN: A MYERSONIAN APPROACH ECONOMETRICA

Pavan, A., Segal, I., Toikka, J. 2014; 82 (2): 601-653

• The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2014; 81 (1): 273-289

• AN EFFICIENT DYNAMIC MECHANISM ECONOMETRICA

Athey, S., Segal, I. 2013; 81 (6): 2463-2485

• Property Rights Handbook of Organizational Economics

Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. edited by Gibbons, R., Roberts, J.

Princeton University Press.2012

• A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining) THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2011; 6 (1): 109-125

• Optimal Information Disclosure JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Rayo, L., Segal, I. 2010; 118 (5): 949-987

• Nash implementation with little communication THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

Segal, I. R.

2010; 5 (1): 51-71

• The communication cost of selfishness JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Fadel, R., Segal, I.

2009; 144 (5): 1895-1920

• Antitrust in innovative industries AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D.

2007; 97 (5): 1703-1730

• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Segal, I.

2007; 136 (1): 341-378

• Designing efficient mechanisms for dynamic bilateral trading games 119th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association

Athey, S., Segal, I.

AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC.2007: 131-36

Auctions with severely bounded communication JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I.

2007; 28: 233-266

• Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey European Competition Law Review

Segal, I. R.

2007: 323-32

• Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings

Athey, S. ., Segal, I. R.

2007: 131-6

• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Nisan, N., Segal, I.

2006; 129 (1): 192-224

• Communication in economic mechanisms 9th World Congress of the Econometric-Society

Segal, I.

CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS.2006: 222-68

• Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games Combinatorial Auctions

Segal, I. R.

edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R.

MIT Press.2006

Communication in Economic Mechanisms Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs)

Segal, I. R.

edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T.

Cambridge University Press.2006

• Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X

Nisan, N., Segal, I. R.

2005: 158-164

Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X

Fadel, R., Segal, I. R.

2005: 165-76

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Segal, I.

2003; 113 (2): 147-181

• Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Segal, I.

2003; 93 (3): 509-529

• Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric-Society

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D.

WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC.2003: 757-91

• Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES

Segal, I

2003; 70 (2): 439-460

• Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication 11th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2003)

Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I.

SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN.2003: 102-113

Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. R.

2003

• Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets ECONOMETRICA

Milgrom, P., Segal, I.

2002; 70 (2): 583-601

The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing) ECONOMETRICA

Segal, I., Whinston, M. D.

2002; 70 (1): 1-45

• Naked exclusion: Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. D.

2000; 90 (1): 296-309

• Exclusive contracts and protection of investments RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. D.

2000; 31 (4): 603-633

Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments RAND Journal of Economics

Whinston, M., Segal, I. R.

2000; 31 (4): 603-633

Contracting with externalities QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

Segal, I.

1999; 114 (2): 337-388

• Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES

Segal, I.

1999; 66 (1): 57-82

• Monopoly and soft budget constraint RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

SEGAL, I. R.

1998; 29 (3): 596-609

• Solutions Manual for "Microeconomic Theory" by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green

Hara, C., Segal, I., Tadelis, S.

Oxford University Press.1997

VENTILATORY EFFECTS OF CLONIDINE ALONE AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ALFENTANIL, IN HUMAN VOLUNTEERS 1991 ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOC OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS

Jarvis, D. A., Duncan, S. R., SEGAL, I. S., Maze, M.

LIPPINCOTT-RAVEN PUBL.1992: 899-905