

# Stanford

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## Keith Krehbiel

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Political Economy

### Bio

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#### ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

- Emeritus (Active) Professor, Political Economy

### Publications

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#### PUBLICATIONS

- **The Manchin Paradox** *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*  
Krehbiel, K., Krehbiel, S.  
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- **Pivotal Politics as Normal Science** *JOURNAL OF POLITICS*  
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- **Legislative organization and ideal-point bias** *JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS*  
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- **Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*  
Callander, S., Krehbiel, K.  
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- **Supreme court appointments as a move-the-median game** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*  
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- **Joe Cannon and the minority party: Tyranny or bipartisanship?** *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*  
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- **Parties in elections, parties in government, and partisan bias** *POLITICAL ANALYSIS*  
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● **The coefficient of party influence** *POLITICAL ANALYSIS*

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● **Minority rights and majority power: Theoretical consequences of the motion to recommit** *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*

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● **Plausibility of signals by a heterogeneous committee** *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*

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● **Party discipline and measures of partisanship** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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● **The party effect from A to Z and beyond** *JOURNAL OF POLITICS*

Krehbiel, K.

1999; 61 (3): 832-840

● **Paradoxes of parties in Congress** *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*

Krehbiel, K.

1999; 24 (1): 31-64

● **Specialization decisions within committee** *JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION*

Gilligan, T. W., Krehbiel, K.

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● **Restrictive rules reconsidered** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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● **COSPONSORS AND WAFFLERS FRONT A-TO-Z** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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● **THE GAINS FROM EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION** *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*

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● **THE ANALYSIS OF COMMITTEE POWER - AN APPLICATION TO SENATE VOTING ON THE MINIMUM-WAGE** *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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● **SPATIAL MODELS OF LEGISLATIVE CHOICE** *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*

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